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§1. Introduction
In De Anima, Aristotle states: “one must understand that the sense is that 
which is receptive of the sensible forms without the material” (DA, 424a17-
19). However, as W.V. Wilkes puts it in her Psuchē Versus the Mind:
it is, to put it mildly, hard to understand Aristotle’s insistence 
that perceiving and thinking is a matter of ‘receiving the form’ 
and becoming ‘identical with its object’ (EADA, 126).
To put it mildly, I agree. Some interpreters (specifically M.F. Burnyeat) 
take it that, for Aristotle, awareness is primitive and no material or physiologi-
cal process of a sense organ is necessary for perception. Other interpreters 
(specifically Hilary Putnam & Martha Nussbaum) take it that, for Aristotle, 
even though the soul (psuchē) is not reducible to material or physiological 
processes of a sense organ, such processes are necessary for the realization of 
perception. In this paper, I provide further support to Putnam & Nussbaum’s 
position, although I do not go so far as to claim that their position is the correct 
one; rather, I focus on criticizing Burnyeat. In particular, to open up room for 
his interpretation, Burnyeat seems to find it necessary, in “How Much Hap-
pens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?”, to interpret the process 
involved in vision as being no process at all. It is this interpretation of vision I 
will be arguing against.
First, I provide a general sketch of Aristotle’s theory of soul and his form-
matter distinction, because it will help us understand Aristotle’s theory of per-
ception (which vision is a part of) and how such differing interpretations of it 
can arise. Second, I provide fuller accounts of Putnam & Nussbaum and Burn-
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yeat’s respective interpretations of Aristotle, as this will clarify what is at stake. 
Last, I provide not only what I take to be a very general sketch of the key com-
ponents for Aristotle when it comes to vision, but also the naïve (i.e. natural) 
way to interpret him. Then I examine how Burnyeat deals with the problems 
that the naïve interpretation presents his own interpretation; and via this in-
vestigation Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of vision is revealed, 
and as it emerges, I criticize it and give my own account of Aristotle’s theory 
of vision. Moreover, I anticipate and treat a couple of possible objections that 
Burnyeat might make.
§2. Aristotle’s Theory of Soul, Form-Matter Distinction, and 
Theory of Perception
§2.1. Aristotle’s Theory of Soul
The starting point for understanding Aristotle’s theory of perception is 
understanding how perception fits in with the rest of De Anima. In De Anima, 
Aristotle is providing his own account of the soul (psuchē). This should not be 
confused for what is typically conceived of as the soul today; as some ethereal 
thing that lives on after death, enjoying a rich cognitive life. Instead, Aristotle 
claims that the soul is “the form of a natural body that has life as its potency” 
(DA, 412a19). To break down this statement, we need to have a basic under-
standing of what Aristotle means by ‘form’, ‘body’, and ‘potency’.
For Aristotle, there are three substances: form, material, and the compos-
ite of form and material.1 Form is the essence of a thing; it is what makes an 
object the particular type of object that it is, and what type an object is can be 
determined by its shape and function. For instance, if an object is shaped such 
that it has a handle and a head with a sharp edge, and if that object’s function is 
to chop wood, then the object in question is an axe. Or, if an object is shaped 
such that it is spherical, and if that object has the function of seeing, then that 
object is an eye.2 Now, material is the matter of a type of object. For instance, 
it’s both the wood that makes up the axe-handle and the iron that makes up the 
axe-head that, in turn, make up the axe. Or, it is the water and eye-jelly (i.e., 
eyeball) that makes up an eye. The composite, on the other hand, is the conjunc-
1 ‘Substance’ here does not mean an independently existing thing or substratum 
(EADA, 58).
2 Perhaps in this case, it doesn’t matter what the shape of the thing is, but only that its 
function is to see; in which case, it’s an eye.
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tion of form and matter into a unity; for example, the axe and eye just discussed 
are composite objects; indeed, Aristotle notes that “[t]here is no need… to 
inquire whether soul and body are one” (DA, 412b5). And so, we see, for Aris-
totle, that composite objects have two aspects to their being: form and matter.
Now we can better understand Aristotle’s definition of ‘soul’. First, the 
composite bodies in question are living bodies; these turn out to be particu-
lar plants, animals, or humans. The material of these composite bodies have 
the potential or power to be living, which is what is meant by ‘potency’. The 
soul, on the other hand, is the essence of living things; that is, the soul is what 
makes plants, animals, and humans living things, and it explains the biologi-
cal or mental functions of plants, animals, and humans. Specifically, the soul 
explains three general functions of living things. The intellective soul accounts 
for thought and understanding, which only humans have. The perceptive soul 
accounts for touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing; all and only animals have 
touch, including humans, but some animals have some additional combination 
of these perceptive powers. The nutritive soul is the most basic; it accounts for 
growth, decline, reproduction, and the assimilation of food. All living things, 
including plants, have a nutritive soul.
§2.2. Form-Matter Distinction
Given Aristotle’s definition of soul, and given that one of the functions that 
the soul explains is that of perception, we see that soul will play a vital role in 
Aristotle’s theory of perception. But it is Aristotle’s distinction between form 
and matter that has caused so much interest in how his theory of perception 
unfolds. First of all, the form-matter distinction doesn’t break down into the 
Cartesian mind-body distinction; otherwise, as Wilkes notes, we’ll have to ad-
mit that grass has a mind, since grass has a form (EADA 113). Moreover, Aris-
totle will not be giving us a reductionist account of perception. This is the case, 
as even though form and matter are always found unified within a composite 
object and are thus, in some sense one, Aristotle takes them to be ontologically 
distinct. He classifies form as an immaterial substance, while claiming that mat-
ter is a material one. Therefore, the reductionist claim (that the matter of an 
object determines its nature or essence) is not open to Aristotle, since, on his 
view, it is the form and not the matter that determines an object’s essence. That 
means concerning vision, it cannot be that Aristotle wants to claim that seeing 
just is certain physiological processes in the eyeball, brain, or heart. But if not 
Cartesian dualism, and if not some reductionism (e.g., a type identity theory), 
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what does Aristotle’s account of perception look like?
§2.3. Theory of Perception
Just because reductionism is off the table, it doesn’t follow that some ma-
terial or physiological process in the sense organ is not necessary for percep-
tion. And just because Cartesian dualism is off the table, it doesn’t follow that 
perception doesn’t occur solely on the level of awareness, without the need of 
any material or physiological process. It is the former consequence that opens 
the playing field to Putnam & Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
perception, while it is the latter consequence that opens the same playing field 
to Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of perception. Now that we 
have grasped why two contrary interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of percep-
tion is at least initially possible, let us turn to filling out what those interpreta-
tions are.
§3. Putnam & Nussbaum and Burnyeat’s Interpretations of 
Aristotle’s Theory of Perception
§3.1. Putnam & Nussbaum’s Interpretation
First we will consider Putnam & Nussbaum’s interpretation. In Changing 
Aristotle’s Mind, Putnam & Nussbaum say the following:
Metaph. ZII asserts the point unconditionally about animals… 
‘For the animal is a perceptible thing, and it is not possible 
to define it without change, therefore not without the bodily 
parts’ being in a certain condition’ (1036b27 ff.). The inferen-
tial pattern . . . suggests that Aristotle makes an intimate—
indeed a necessary—connection between change and mate-
riality . . . [I]t was apparently taken for granted that change 
is something that goes on in materials, and indeed that what 
matter is is the vehicle of change.
We believe that this is still a reasonable position (although 
we do not go so far as to identify change with matter). In our 
conception, any being that undergoes change is a material be-
ing. We cannot prise these two things apart, even in thought, 
without incoherence. From this it follows that any account 
that properly gives the what-is-it of such a being must make 
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mention . . . of the presence of material composition that is in 
some way suitable or in the right state. This tells us that on pain 
of incoherence we cannot describe the natural functions that 
are the essential natures of animals and plants without making 
these functions (even if only implicitly) embodied in some 
matter that is suitable to them: matter that is not simply an 
inert background, but the very vehicle of functioning itself.
All of this is supposed to be true of all the essential being 
and doings of natural substances; a fortiori (apparently) of the 
being and doings of living creatures; a fortiori (one might sup-
pose) of perceiving. (EADA, 32)
The first paragraph of this passage tells us that if change or movement is 
part of the essence of a thing (which it is for animals), then it is impossible to 
give the essence of the thing without referring to its material states. Since, 
the essence of a thing is cashed out in terms of its function (i.e., form), then 
it follows that to explicate the functions of animals, one must include talk of 
the material composition of the animal’s parts. And since perceiving is a func-
tion of animals, then, to give those functions, one must also give the material 
compositions of eyeballs, ears, etc. According to Putnam & Nussbaum, this is 
not to claim that the material composition of a sense organ is identical with the 
perception, for that would make Aristotle a reductionist; instead, the material 
composition of the sense organ constitutes or realizes the perception. Thus, if 
there is a change in perception, then there must have been a change in the sense 
organ, which has the significance of having Aristotle support the functionalist 
solution to the mind-body problem.3
What is significant to this paper is that this commits Putnam & Nussbaum 
to interpreting Aristotle as claiming that the effect a sensible object (e.g., color) 
has (through some medium) on a sense organ (e.g., eye) amounts to a real 
change or alteration; for without a real change or alteration in the sense organ 
there would be no change in perception corresponding to the sensible object’s 
effect. Even though in Changing Aristotle’s Mind, Putnam and Nussbaum use dif-
ferent evidence from what I offer below in §4 to argue that the effect of sensible 
objects is indeed a real alteration, I leave it up to the reader to review their 
arguments.
3 Though, this is not to claim that Aristotle is a full-fledged functionalist, but instead, 
that he and functionalists coincide on this matter.
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§3.2. Burnyeat’s Interpretation
Now we consider Burnyeat’s interpretation. He states that there is:
no physiological change is needed for the eye or the organ of 
touch to become aware of the appropriate perceptual objects. 
The model says: the effect on the organ is the awareness, no 
more and no less. This second point is the one that is puz-
zling from a modern point of view, the one that is inimical 
to the Putnam-Nussbaum assimilation of Aristotle to modern 
functionalism, for it means that in a certain sense an animal’s 
perceptual capacities do not require explanation. For Aristo-
tle such capacities are part of animal life and in Aristotle’s 
world the emergence of life does not require explanation… 
The secondary qualities (so called by us) are already out there 
in his world, fully real; these are the sensible forms. All that 
is needed for perception to take place is for these qualities 
or forms to act on the corresponding faculties in us to bring 
about an awareness of themselves… Not merely is there no 
deduction from physiology to perception, not merely are 
there no physiological sufficient conditions for perception to 
occur, but the only necessary conditions are states of recep-
tivity to sensible form: transparent eye-jelly, still air walled 
up in the ear, intermediate temperature and hardness in the 
organ of touch. When these have been specified, the material 
side of the story of perception is complete. That, at any rate, 
is my thesis about what Aristotle’s thesis about perception is. 
(EADA, 22-3)
Thus, for Burnyeat’s interpretation, awareness is to be taken as primitive. 
As a result, no physiological process is necessary. The significance of Burnyeat’s 
interpretation is that Aristotle’s theory of perception cannot solve the mind-
body problem, since perception does not require explanation. Thus, Putnam & 
Nussbaum’s appropriation of Aristotle to the functionalist solution of the mind-
body problem is a mistake, or so says Burnyeat.
But note that Burnyeat does say that, for perception to take place, some 
material conditions are necessary; namely, certain material states must be re-
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ceptive to sensible forms. Intuitively, however, if these material states are recep-
tive to sensible forms, then the sensible forms can act upon them. And, if these 
material states are acted upon, it is intuitive to think that the action changes 
them; thus, there is prima facie reason for thinking that a physiological process 
must occur to have perception. This is why, in my view, Burnyeat tries show 
that in perceiving (including vision), the action of the sensible forms amounts 
to no real action or process at all. We would do well to turn to sketching a gen-
eral interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of vision. After which, we can flesh out 
Burnyeat’s interpretation of it; providing criticism of his view.
§4. A General and Naïve Sketch of Aristotle’s Theory of 
Perception, Burnyeat’s Interpretation, and My Criticisms
§4.1. A General and Naïve Sketch
It should be kept in mind that in what follows in this paragraph is supposed 
to be a naïve reading of Book II chapter 7 of De Anima (See 418a25-419b2). 
Such a reading claims that, for Aristotle, at least these three things are necessary 
for there to be sight: one, a living eye; two, an actualized transparent medium; 
and three, color. Let’s consider how these work together for vision to occur. 
First, the color is the proper object of sight, and it is external to the eye. The na-
ture of color is to set the actualized transparent medium into motion; thus, the 
color is the actor, while the transparent medium is what is being immediately 
moved. Second, the transparent medium is a property of both air and water. In 
its potentiality, the transparent medium is dark and color cannot be seen. Light 
actualizes the transparent medium; and so, color only acts on the transparent 
medium when it is illuminated. Third, the eye is made up of eye-jelly, which is 
mostly made of water. Recall that the transparent medium is not only a prop-
erty of air, but of water too; and so, the transparent medium within the eye is 
mediately moved by the color via the transparent medium that’s outside the 
eye, which the color had immediately moved. Thus, on the naïve reading, we 
see that, for Aristotle, the movement in question occurs within the eye; that is, 
on the naïve reading, it seems we have a physiological process. Our question, 
then, is what does this movement amount to?
§4.2. Burnyeat’s Interpretation of ‘Movement’
In book II chapter 5 of De Anima, Aristotle states both that “perception in-
volves being moved and undergoing something” and later that “all things are 
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acted upon and moved by what already is at work and productive of motion” 
(DA, 416b30 & 417a18). Talk of “being moved” and being “acted upon” implies 
suggests material change. If, for perception to take place, it is necessary that 
a sense organ be acted upon such that one of its components must be moved, 
then Burnyeat’s interpretation will be manifestly wrong, since such a move-
ment would be a physiological process.
But Burnyeat points out that what has been translated into ‘movement’ 
is ‘kinēsis’ (EADA, 424). He says that this is deeply misleading, because “we 
must not understand ‘motion’ as ‘locomotion’”, for “[k]inēsis in Aristotle’s us-
age is the generic term for all kinds of change, including alteration. . . . [And] 
kinētikon just means ‘productive of a change’, not ‘productive of spatial move-
ment’” (ibid.). Thus, to say that color moves the transparent medium is not to 
say that color moves the medium from one spatial location to another; instead, 
what can be inferred is that color affects some sort of change upon the medium. 
And since the color mediately affects the eye via the transparent medium, we 
can infer, at best, that the color affects some sort of change upon the eye, but 
we cannot yet infer that that change is locomotive. In this way, Burnyeat suc-
cessfully dodges the charge that Aristotle means for the color to spatially move 
parts of the eye, which would clearly be a physiological process. But if parts of 
the eye undergo change, even if it isn’t a change in spatial location, then it might 
still be argued that that change amounts to a physiological process; indeed, that 
is precisely the avenue Putnam & Nussbaum take (See EADA, 37-41).
§4.2. Burnyeat’s Interpretation of Vision and Quasi-Alteration
To avoid the charge that the change in question is still a physiological pro-
cess even though its not a movement, Burnyeat interprets the process of sight 
such that the change doesn’t refer to a real alteration, and thereby, not a real 
process (EADA, 425). First, Burnyeat points out that, on Aristotle’s account, 
light doesn’t travel; moreover, light is not only the actuality of the transparent 
medium, but it is what makes color go from potentially being present to actu-
ally being present (EADA, 424). Thus, Burnyeat concludes, that the effect of 
color doesn’t travel either; it just instantaneously appears through the transpar-
ent medium when it’s illuminated, and this “appearing through” just is the effect 
color has on the transparent medium and is no real alteration (EADA, 425). On 
this Burnyeat states:
[w]hen the medium is actually transparent (diaphanes), i.e. 
when the medium is such that colours can appear through 
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it (phainesthai dia), they do appear through it. At the same 
time, the transparent itself, the light, becomes visible in a way 
and coloured in a way—without being really coloured and, 
in consequence, without undergoing a real alteration. This 
non-real alteration—a quasi-alteration I shall call it—of the 
transparent consists in the fact that colours appear through 
it. (ibid.)
The effect of color seems to be a quasi-alteration for two reasons. First, 
since the effect of color is instantaneous with the illumination of light, no pro-
cess takes place; instead, the state of affairs is static (EADA, 424). And, since 
a physiological process is a process, if no process is to be had, then no physi-
ological process is to be had either. Second, the transparent medium isn’t really 
colored (EADA, 425). To understand this second point, consider the example 
Burnyeat gives for illustration (EADA, 425-6). Suppose you put your eye up to 
a bowl of water and a red object is placed on the other side of the bowl. From 
your point of view, you will see the color red, but note that slightly changing 
the angle makes it such that the red will no longer be viewable. On the other 
hand, if the water were to be dyed red, then you could see the red color no 
matter the angle you viewed the bowl. The reason you can see red on the latter 
situation is because the water (i.e., the transparent medium) has literally been 
affected (i.e., a real change or alteration has taken place); however, the reason 
you don’t see red at every angle in the former condition is because it hasn’t 
literally been affected (i.e., no real change or alteration has taken place).
§4.3. My Criticisms and Considered Objections
As far as I can see, there are two reasons for thinking this account can be 
plausibly ascribed to Aristotle. First, it does justice to why Aristotle labels the 
medium ‘transparent’, since what is transparent just is that which other objects 
can appear through. Second, although Aristotle claims that “perception involves 
being moved and undergoing something”, he clearly thinks the “alteration” is 
not alteration in the standard sense; indeed ‘being acted upon’ and ‘being al-
tered’ aren’t even the correct terms according to Aristotle, but he uses them 
because no other term suffices (DA, 418a1-8). Since Burnyeat holds that the 
“alteration” is not a real alteration, it would seem that his reading of Aristotle 
accords well.
§4.3.1. A Process after All
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However, I find there to be many concerns with Burnyeat’s rendering. 
First, he doesn’t sufficiently show that a process doesn’t take place when the 
transparent medium is illuminated. That’s because Burnyeat’s scope for a pro-
cess is too small. For example, consider two contiguous instants of time, t1 and 
t2. At t1 we have an eye in darkness, perceiving no color. At t2, we have the same 
eye in light perceiving color. Even if there is no process at t2, because it is but 
an instant of time, it is still reasonable to ask whether the physiology of the eye 
at t1 is different than its physiology at t2; and, if the eye’s physiology does differ 
between those times, it’s reasonable to ask whether the light and color caused 
that difference and whether the difference was necessary for perception. In 
short, although t2 doesn’t amount to a process, t1 to t2 does.
§4.3.2. Recollecting in the Dark
Second, Aristotle says: “perception originates from things present, whereas 
recollection, proceeding from the soul, results in either motions in the organs 
of sense or in persisting states of them” (DA, 408b15-20). If it’s the function 
of recollection to conjure up images of past perceptions without the object of 
perception being present, it’s certainly interesting that doing so results in “mo-
tions” in the sense organs (or persisting states of them). The suggestion seems 
to be that to be aware of images, there must be motion in the sense organs, 
independent of whether the images one is aware of is to be characterized as 
perceptions or recollections; if perception is primitive, Aristotle would have 
no need to insist that recollection results in the motion of the sense organs. 
But, if that is the case, then it cannot be that the “alteration” in question merely 
amounts to the color appearing through the illuminated transparent medium; 
that’s because recollection can take place even when the transparent medium is 
in its potential state (i.e., when there is no light). Thus, the “alteration” in ques-
tion must be a real change, though non-standard; or, if the “alteration” of the 
illuminated transparent medium amounts to color merely appearing through 
the medium (and such an “alteration” is no alteration) it does not follow that the 
mediate effect upon the eye is also not a real alteration.
§4.3.3. Communicable Change, Though Non-Standard Change
Third, the following two passages suggest that we should read the “altera-
tion” in question as real, though non-standard:
[a] mobile animal . . . must perceive not only when it is 
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touched, but also from afar. This would be the case if it were 
able to perceive through a medium, from the medium being 
acted upon and moved by what is perceptible and the animal 
in turn by it. For it is just like that which causes motion with respect 
to place (emphasis mine), which produces change up to a cer-
tain point: that which pushes another thing makes the latter 
push as well; the movement occurs through an intermediary; 
the first mover pushes without being pushed, while what is 
last is only pushed and does not push; and intermediaries are 
many. So it is in the case of alteration as well (emphasis mine), 
except that it alters something that remains in the same place, 
like when one presses into wax and it is moved only so far as 
one has pressed. A stone would not be moved at all, but water 
would for some distance, while air is moved a great deal and 
acts and is acted upon, if it remains stable and unified. (DA, 
434b25-435a5)
The other sense organs could come to be from elements 
aside from earth; but they all produce perception by means 
of perceiving through something else and through a medium, 
whereas touch involves touching things (hence the very name 
it bears). To be sure, the other sense organs also perceive by touch, but 
on account of something other than themselves (emphasis mine). 
(DA, 435a11-19)
In the first passage, I emphasize that the alteration involved in perceiving 
something from afar is like locomotion; namely, it’s communicative, for as Aris-
totle says, in locomotion the mover moves an intermediate object, which then 
communicates that movement to another object. Even though the “alteration” 
in the case of the transparent medium is non-standard, and even though the 
air is not moved in terms of locomotion, Aristotle is telling us that the altera-
tion is first communicated from the color to the transparent medium, and then 
from the transparent medium to the sense organ. If this communication is to be 
analogous to locomotion in the way Aristotle specifies, then we end up with a 
process of actual change. Burnyeat’s interpretation of the “alteration” as merely 
appearing through the transparent medium (and so, as no real alteration at all) 
was meant to block that such a communicative process takes place for Aristotle. 
But, as we see, Aristotle says otherwise; thus, Burnyeat’s interpretation does 
not look to be right.
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Moreover, the analogy between pressing into wax and “pressing” into air 
(or the transparent medium) is also suggestive of a communicative process and 
real change. While the latter pressing is not the same as the former pressing 
(since, in the former, locomotion takes place and in the latter, it doesn’t), the 
word ‘pressing’ suggests a change of some sort. For instance, the wax’s shape is 
changed when it is pressed upon; likewise, then, the color impresses a change 
on the transparent medium. Indeed, in the second passage we learn that all per-
ception comes by touch; thus, the way that all senses operate is through some 
sort of contact. Concerning vision, how is this contact to be understood? Taking 
the two passages together, the following is what’s suggested. First, the color is 
in contact with the illuminated transparent medium. Second, the transparent 
medium is in contact with the eye. Third, it is the nature of color to act upon 
the illuminated transparent medium, such that the color communicates a non-
standard change to the illuminated transparent medium. Last, non-standard 
change communicated to the illuminated transparent medium is then commu-
nicated to the eye.
§4.4. The Function of the Transparent Medium
§4.4.1. Burnyeat’s Interpretation: It Separates
Here, we would to well to make a small digression before turning to an ob-
jection that Burnyeat might make. This is so, because the fact that all perception 
involves touch (i.e., contact) is not only damaging to his view that no process 
or real alteration occurs, but it damages another part of his interpretation of the 
conditions of vision. As Burnyeat states:
[i]t is dangerously easy for us to suppose that the impossibil-
ity of direct action by colour on sight is to be explained by 
the fact that the colour is situated at a distance. The function 
of the medium is to join the object perceived to the subject 
perceiving it. The medium is needed to transmit the colour, 
or information about it, to the sight of the perceiver. (EADA, 
426)
Instead of interpreting Aristotle as saying that the transparent medium 
joins the color to the eye (albeit indirectly), he interprets Aristotle as claiming 
that the transparent medium separates the color from the eye. He notes that 
Aristotle’s point is that if he color were to directly touch the eye, then the color 
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would not be seen. As Burnyeat claims:
[t]his implies that the function of the medium is primarily 
to separate the object perceived from the perceiving subject 
(ibid.).
Indeed, this is supposedly why Aristotle takes Democritus’ view (i.e., the 
view that, if there were void between a viewer and a viewable object, then the 
viewer would see the viewable object with the utmost clarity) to be false:
[b]ut from Aristotle’s point of view, if per impossible there was 
a void, i.e. nothing, between subject and object, then so far 
as explanation goes the situation would be just like the case 
where an object is put directly on the eye (EADA, 427).
§4.4.2. My Criticism: It Joins and Separates
This, however, has Aristotle either equivocating on ‘void’ or ‘nothing’ or 
not realizing that the eye and color are separate since there is distance between 
them. If the explanation would be similar to the case where an object is put 
directly on the eye, then the word ‘nothing’ must be interpreted as meaning 
that not only is there no medium (e.g., transparent medium) between the color 
and the eye, but there must be no distance either; clearly, by ‘void’ or ‘nothing’, 
Democritus does not intend to exclude distance, for the object we would see 
with the utmost clarity is an ant in the heavens (DA, 419a15-23). If Aristotle 
isn’t equivocating, then there is distance between the color and the eye; a for-
tiori, the eye and color are separate, which then satisfies the condition Burnyeat 
has Aristotle giving us for vision to occur. Then Aristotle should claim, however, 
that we would perceive color when there is void between the color and our eyes. 
Yet, he claims that we would not. Therefore, it cannot be that the function of the 
transparent medium is to separate the eye from the color and not join them. 
Instead, in Aristotelian fashion, it must be that the transparent medium, in one 
way, separates the eye from the color; yet, in another way, joins the color to the 
eye. Thus, while it is “easy for us to suppose that the impossibility of direct ac-
tion by colour on sight is to be explained by the fact that the colour is situated 
at a distance” (EADA, 426). It is, by no means a dangerous supposition.
Furthermore, it is odd that Burnyeat does not take a different approach. It 
would be much more natural for him to interpret Aristotle as claiming that the 
reason we would not see color, if there were void between it and our eyes, is 
that, without the transparent medium, there is nothing for the color to appear 
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through to the perceiver. This would have the benefit of being consistent with 
Burnyeat’s interpretation that there is no real alteration; moreover, it does not 
force an interpretation onto Aristotle such that he either equivocates over ‘void’ 
and ‘nothing’ or makes him inconsistent. However, we have already seen a few 
problems with accepting Burnyeat’s interpretation.
§4.5. Possible Objections and Possible Responses
§4.5.1. Communicable Change Leads to Haphazard Vision
Turning back to Burnyeat’s interpretation that, for Aristotle, color merely 
appears through the transparent medium, such a view can be defended by ob-
jecting that the interpretation we are giving—one that involves communicable 
change—would have people’s field of vision be a haphazard blob of changing 
colors. For supposing that there is a real change being communicated from 
the color through the transparent medium to the eye, then, like Burnyeat’s 
example of the bowl of water that is dyed red (i.e. where the water literally 
changes to being red), the transparent medium should fill up with all of these 
real changes. In that case, the changes would 1) in some sense (though not a lo-
comotive sense) run into each other, perhaps resulting in some sort of competi-
tion between the real changes (e.g. think of what happens when multiple dyes 
are put in a bowl of water), and 2) people should experience colors in their 
visual field from objects that are not in front of their eyes; the latter because 
the colors behind a person’s eyes are acting on the transparent medium just as 
much as the colors in front of a person’s eyes, thereby filling the medium up 
with real changes (e.g. think of a perceiving eye in the bowl of water, where the 
dye is placed behind it; in that case, the color will eventually communicate in 
front of the eye and to it).
Burnyeat’s interpretation does not run into such a problem, since, on his 
view, there is no real change. That is, since colors merely appear through the 
transparent medium, the perceiver will only experience those colors that are 
appearing through the medium at the perceiver’s eyes. Burnyeat can object, 
then, that any reading of Aristotle that has him claiming that color communi-
cates a real change to the transparent medium saddles Aristotle with an unten-
able position. And since we ought to give Aristotle a charitable reading, if there 
is another reading that both is a reasonable reading and doesn’t saddle Aristotle 
with an untenable position, then we ought to take it; namely, we ought to ac-
cept his interpretation.
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§4.5.2. Possible Responses: Directionality Defense and Untenable 
Position
There are a few responses that might be taken against this move. First, one 
might claim that, for some of the reasons already given, Burnyeat’s interpreta-
tion doesn’t provide a reasonable reading of Aristotle; in which case, perhaps 
some third alternative interpretation should be sought and adopted. Second, 
one might claim that, given enough textual support contrary to the charitable 
reading, we must sacrifice charity for accuracy; that is, since philosophers have 
been known, from time to time, to adopt untenable positions, given enough 
textual support for Aristotle holding an untenable position, then that is probably 
the accurate reading. Third, one might endeavor to show that the communicable 
change interpretation doesn’t saddle Aristotle with the problem that Burnyeat 
or others might charge it with. And fourth, one might show that Burnyeat’s 
interpretation would also saddle Aristotle with an untenable position, thereby 
showing it to be no better than the communicable change interpretation. While 
there are grounds for thinking that the first two responses would be success-
ful against such an objection (namely, the reasons already provided), it can be 
shown that the communicable change interpretation doesn’t necessarily saddle 
Aristotle with the problem in question. And, if that can be shown, then the 
objection can be resisted; moreover, it can be shown that Burnyeat’s interpreta-
tion also forces Aristotle into an untenable position. First, we will turn to de-
veloping an instance of the third type of response. Then we will turn to showing 
the untenable position with which Burnyeat’s interpretation saddles Aristotle.
§4.5.2.1. Directionality Defense
The problem the objection provides is that, on the communicable change 
interpretation, it looks like the change will permeate haphazardly throughout 
the transparent medium. Thus, in providing the response, we will need to rely 
on the notion of directionality; then we will need to find textual support for 
taking Aristotle to think that, not only is there communicable change, but that it 
is directional. First, let’s clarify the notion of directionality and why it gets the 
communicable change interpretation out of the problem.
Imagine a steel cylinder rod that is spiked on one end of it. One property of 
such an object is that it has a piercing effect, but, assuming that no other object 
comes toward it, it has the piercing effect only if the spiked end is moving in the 
direction of another object and makes contact with the other object. The point 
16 Auslegung 30/2
to be taken away from this example (pun intended) is that the piercing effect 
can only take place if the right part is moving in the right direction; namely, 
the spiked end moving at the object. For, if the rod were to be swung at the 
object, then, instead of getting a piercing effect, we would get a blunt-force-
effect; or, if the object in question is only receptive to piercing effects and not to 
blunt-force-effects, then we would have no effect at all. That the communicable 
change caused by color must be moving in the right direction at the right part 
of the eye is one part of what I mean by ‘directionality’.
But now imagine a world where the physics of it is like ours, except, in-
stead of there being light, there is smlight. Smlight is very much like light, for 
both have the directional character explained above, but it is unlike light in that 
it does not diffuse (or randomly alter course—this is the other part of what I 
mean by ‘directionality’); moreover, both light and smlight have the property 
that, when it strikes our eyes, we perceive color. As you probably know, if a 
laser beam of light is beamed through fog, you will see color, since parts of 
the light beam are diffusing off and traveling to your eye. This is not so with a 
smlaser beam of smlight; since parts of smlight will not diffuse and travel to 
your eye, you will not see color when a smlaser beam of smlight is beamed into 
fog. In fact, the only way to see the color of the smlaser beam is if your eye is 
directly in the path of the beam, such that your eye is pointed towards it. Thus, 
if the effect that color has on the transparent medium has directionality as I have 
just explained it, then the possible objection does not succeed. That’s because 
the perceiving-color-effect that the communicable change has on a perceiver’s 
eye cannot take place unless the perceiver is facing the color from which the 
perceiving-color-effect is coming from, so, even though the transparent me-
dium is filling up with real changes caused by color, no person’s visual field 
will be a blob of haphazard color. The next question, then, is whether the text 
supports such a reading.
Consider some of the textual support. First, the analogy between loco-
motion and the communicable nonstandard change discussed earlier suggests 
directionality; that’s because, when one object bumps into another, the second 
object moves in the direction from whence it was hit. Second, the analogy be-
tween the pressing of wax and the communicable nonstandard change discussed 
earlier also suggests directionality; that’s because, if one wants to impress an 
object into wax, one will most likely move the object straight at and into the 
wax.
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§4.5.2.2. Burnyeat Saddles Aristotle with an Untenable Position
Now, even if you don’t think the directionality story that I have painted can 
be plausibly ascribed to Aristotle, I can still show that Burnyeat’s interpretation 
that the transparent medium simply allows the color to appear through it will 
also saddle Aristotle with an untenable position. On the story I have painted, 
Aristotle is able to explain why images and colors can be reflected by things 
with smooth surfaces, such as mirrors or pools of water; that’s because, even 
though it’s generally the case that the communicable change is communicated 
in one direction, such surfaces have the property of redirecting the commu-
nication of change in another direction. Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle 
can’t explain this phenomenon. That’s because no real change happens on his 
account; the color merely appears through the transparent medium. Thus, if 
one had one’s back to the mirror, the color would appear to that person. But 
if one were looking at the mirror, one would not see any of the colors behind 
one’s self, for those colors only appear through the transparent medium up to 
the mirror and up to the back of your head, not to your eyes; that’s because 
the colors behind you do not produce a real change for the mirror to redirect 
toward your eyes. Therefore, in order to explain reflection of colors and im-
ages, Aristotle must postulate a real change of some sort; otherwise, Aristotle’s 
position is untenable, since smooth surfaces, such as mirrors and pools of water, 
do, in fact, reflect colors.
§5. Conclusion
Hence, given all of the considerations in the previous section, I conclude 
that Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of vision is wrong. It is worth 
pointing out that, while it casts doubt on his interpretation that, for Aristotle, 
perception is primitive, it does not follow that because he was wrong about 
Aristotle’s theory of vision that he is also wrong about whether perception 
is primitive. That’s because, even though there is real communicable change 
being caused by color, and by sensible objects more generally, Burnyeat still 
might show that, once that change has been communicated up to the eye, the 
eyeball does not change, but instead, only the awareness changes. However, the 
fact that he felt pressure to interpret the process of vision as no process at all, 
suggests that such a maneuver would be hard pressed. Furthermore, my objec-
tion in §4.3.2—the recollection in the dark objection—will be particularly 
difficult for Burnyeat to adequately explain away; for, if Burnyeat’s interpreta-
tion is correct, then Aristotle should not be evoking motion in the sense organ 
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for recollection, especially since, given that recollection can take place in the 
dark, that motion can’t be explained away as color merely appearing through 
the transparent medium. Thus, the above considerations cast serious doubt on 
the view that, for Aristotle, perception is primitive; and since it does cast doubt 
on Burnyeat’s interpretation, these considerations help to support Putnam & 
Nussbaum’s position.
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